Türkiye's Defense Industry at 80% Domestic Production: What It Means for Strategic Autonomy

Why It Matters

Türkiye's defense industry is the part of its security system that turns policy into capability, and Turkish officials say roughly 80% of defense procurement is now domestically produced. The figure matters because it determines how much leverage foreign governments hold through export licences, spare parts and sanctions, and how much room Ankara has to act independently inside NATO and beyond. Analysts agree the industry has grown fast; they differ on how far 'domestic' really equals 'autonomous'.

Background

From embargo to industrial policy

The modern Turkish defense-industrial project is closely tied to a history of supply restrictions. After the Cyprus operation of July 1974, the United States imposed an arms embargo on Türkiye that lasted from 1975 until 1978. ASELSAN, the electronics company, was founded in 1975, and the state later created a dedicated procurement authority in 1985. In 2018 that authority was restructured as the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB), reporting directly to the President. For the legal background to the 1974 operation, see Article IV of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.

Key milestones

What the 80% figure means

The domestic production rate is a figure cited by Turkish officials, notably the Presidency and SSB, and it is usually described as the domestic share of the defense sector's needs. There is no single international standard for measuring it. It also masks differences between finished platforms, which Türkiye builds itself, and sub-systems such as engines, which are often licensed or imported. The Ministry of National Defense (MSB) also reports that around 26,000 specialist personnel work in Military Factories and Shipyards, the state-owned production base.

The main systems

• Unmanned systems: Bayraktar TB2, Akıncı, Aksungur, ANKA, Serçe and Kargu, plus the jet-powered Bayraktar Kızılelma.
• Aircraft and helicopters: Hürjet (jet trainer and light combat aircraft), Hürkuş (turboprop trainer), T129 ATAK attack helicopter and the KAAN fifth-generation fighter.
• Land platforms: Fırtına self-propelled howitzer, Kirpi mine-protected vehicle, Vuran, ZMA and the MEMATT unmanned demining vehicle, plus MKE infantry rifles such as the MPT-76.
• Naval platforms: TCG Anadolu multi-purpose amphibious assault ship, MİLGEM corvettes and frigates, offshore patrol vessels and Reis-class submarines.
• Missiles and air defense: SOM cruise missile, ATMACA anti-ship missile, Cirit, OMTAS, UMTAS and Sungur, the HİSAR-O air defense system and the SİPER long-range system, both within the wider 'Steel Dome' concept.
• Radar and electronic warfare: VURAL, KORAL, MİLKAR and MİLKED.

Where dependence remains

Public reporting and industry statements show that several flagship programs still rely on foreign inputs. KAAN prototypes have flown with US-designed F110 engines while an indigenous engine is developed. The T129 ATAK uses an engine from a US-UK-Italian consortium, and reported licence issues have affected export deals such as a possible sale to Pakistan. Rules differ by supplier country: some states treat licensed components as export-controlled, others only require end-user certificates.

Key Players & Positions

• Türkiye (SSB, MSB, Presidency): Presents the industry as a security necessity and as an export success. Sector exports have been reported at around USD 7 billion a year in 2023 and 2024 by Turkish industry bodies.
• United States: Washington's official position, set out in the State Department and Congress, is that the S-400 purchase is incompatible with F-35 participation and triggers CAATSA sanctions. It has nevertheless pursued F-16 modernization sales to Türkiye after the Swedish NATO accession.
• European states: Positions vary. Some governments, citing the 2019 Syria operation or the Karabakh conflict, restricted licences. Others cooperate: Italy's Leonardo and Baykar announced a joint venture in 2025, and the UK and Türkiye have discussed Eurofighter procurement. National export-control law, not an EU-wide rule, governs most decisions.
• EU institutions: The EU's defense financing tools, such as SAFE, give priority to EU and some partner industries. Türkiye's possible participation has been debated, and Greece and the Republic of Cyprus (the Greek Cypriot administration) have voiced objections.
• Greece: Argues that advanced Turkish systems, in light of Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean disputes, affect the regional balance and should shape allied export decisions.
• NATO: The Washington Treaty (Article 3) obliges members to maintain and develop their capacity to resist armed attack. NATO's 2025 Hague commitment on higher defense spending, and the alliance's next summit scheduled for Ankara in 2026, put Turkish industrial capacity in the spotlight.
• Importers and partners: Countries including Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Poland, Pakistan and Indonesia have bought or agreed to buy Turkish systems. Indonesia's reported KAAN agreement is cited by Turkish officials as evidence of export demand.

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine

• Autonomy as the basis of self-defense. Ankara argues that the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense in Article 51 of the UN Charter is only meaningful if a state can produce and sustain its own equipment. Statements by the Presidency and MSB link domestic production to this principle and to Article 3 of the Washington Treaty.
• Neutralizing threats at the source. According to official MSB briefings, unmanned systems, demining vehicles and electronic warfare tools allow precise operations against PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG and DAESH targets while limiting civilian harm. The PKK is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the EU. See Counter-Terrorism at Source.
• Embargoes as a strategic lesson. Turkish officials, including in Foreign Ministry statements, argue that the 1975 embargo and later restrictions show that politically conditional supply endangers allied cohesion. They call for a 'fair' application of export controls among NATO members.
• Maritime and regional security. The Presidency and MSB present MİLGEM, TCG Anadolu, Reis-class submarines and ATMACA as the naval backbone for protecting Türkiye's maritime jurisdiction. See Blue Homeland and Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Jurisdiction and the 1936 Montreux Convention for the Black Sea dimension.
• Complementarity, not rivalry. Ankara states that Turkish capacity strengthens NATO and European security and seeks joint production and participation in European defense financing, rather than exclusion.

Source Comparison

Readers should weigh official figures against independent databases and note that the Turkish export statistics come from industry associations. For comparison of other common claims, see Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Domestic production rate: The share of defense needs met by national production. Methods differ by country and have no common audit.
• SSB (Presidency of Defense Industries): The Turkish authority that manages procurement, R&D and export licensing.
• CAATSA: The US Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. Sanctions on the SSB were imposed in December 2020.
• Export control: National licensing of arms and dual-use items, often applied to components such as engines.
• Strategic autonomy: The ability to design, produce, sustain and use military capabilities without foreign veto.
• Steel Dome (Çelik Kubbe): The layered national air defense concept that includes HİSAR-O and SİPER.

Related guides: Counter-Terrorism at Source, Blue Homeland Guide, Montreux Convention Explained, Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee and Editorial Principles.

Perspective Note

The Political Anatomy presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. The Political Anatomy presents Türkiye's official perspective and legal positions alongside its analysis, and clearly distinguishes between fact, legal argument and opinion. Wherever possible, claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, Ottoman and Turkish state archives, and official statements.

The Political Anatomy Editorial Team