Türkiye–Armenia Normalization Since 2022: Special Representatives, Borders and the Joint Historical Commission Proposal

Why It Matters

The Türkiye Armenia normalization process led by Special Representatives Serdar Kılıç and Ruben Rubinyan is the first sustained, direct political channel between Ankara and Yerevan since the failed Zurich Protocols of 2009. It matters because it links bilateral relations to a wider South Caucasus settlement after the 2020 Karabakh War, including trade routes, transport corridors and the status of the closed land border. Whether the border opens and whether historical disputes can be handled without political ultimatums are the two questions most observers ask.

Background

From 1991 to the Zurich Protocols

Türkiye recognized Armenia's independence in December 1991 but did not establish diplomatic relations. In 1993, during the Armenian occupation of Kelbajar and surrounding Azerbaijani districts, Türkiye closed the land border at Margara–Alican, and it has remained shut ever since. On 10 October 2009, the two foreign ministers signed the Zurich Protocols, which provided for diplomatic relations and an open border, and a sub-commission on the historical dimension. Neither parliament ratified them. Armenia's Constitutional Court issued an interpretive ruling in January 2010 that Ankara viewed as altering the Protocols' substance, and Armenia formally annulled them in March 2018.

The 2005 Joint Historical Commission Proposal

In April 2005, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wrote to the Armenian president proposing a joint commission of historians from both countries and international experts to study the Events of 1915 in all relevant archives. Armenia's response at the time was that the issue should not be a precondition for establishing relations. Ottoman and Turkish state archives are open to researchers, while the Turkish side has repeatedly invited Armenian and third-country archives to be opened on the same basis. For the full legal and archival framework, see The Events of 1915: Archives, Legal Criteria and Türkiye's Fair Memory Approach.

The Post-Karabakh War Context

The 44-day war of September–November 2020 ended with the trilateral statement of 9–10 November 2020 signed by Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia, which also envisaged the unblocking of regional transport links. In September 2023, Azerbaijan's operation brought the remaining Karabakh question to a close and most of the Armenian population left the territory. The regional format known as the '3+3' platform (Türkiye, Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia) met in Moscow in December 2021, in Tehran in October 2023 and in Istanbul in October 2024. In August 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan initialled a peace agreement text at a meeting in Washington; its final signature and ratification depend on both sides, so readers should check the current status.

Timeline of the Kılıç–Rubinyan Track

Dates for individual rounds and the practical state of the crossing should be verified against the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since some steps agreed in principle have been implemented slowly.

Key Players & Positions

Armenia

The Armenian government has stated that it seeks normalization 'without preconditions', including the establishment of diplomatic relations and the opening of the border. Yerevan has said it has no territorial claims on Türkiye, and in recent years its leadership has promoted a 'Crossroads of Peace' initiative for regional connectivity under the sovereignty and jurisdiction of each state, on a reciprocal basis. Armenia's official position on 1915 is that it was genocide, and Armenian officials generally do not regard the history question as something to be settled by a commission.

Azerbaijan

Baku has welcomed the process only insofar as it proceeds in step with an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty. Azerbaijan has also asked Armenia to meet conditions concerning its constitution and the transit route between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan, an arrangement discussed as the 'Zangezur corridor' in Azerbaijani and Turkish usage, while Yerevan insists that any such route stays under Armenian sovereignty.

Russia, the United States and the European Union

Russia was the host of the first Kılıç–Rubinyan meeting and a signatory of the 2020 ceasefire statement, and it has generally supported the reopening of regional rail and road links. The United States has publicly encouraged normalization, and in April 2021 President Joe Biden used the term genocide for the Events of 1915, a position Ankara rejected. The European Union has supported the normalization process in its statements. Several parliaments, including those of France and Germany, have adopted resolutions on 1915 that Türkiye regards as political rather than legal acts.

Historians and Legal Scholars

Many historians and bodies such as the International Association of Genocide Scholars (in a 2007 resolution) characterize the events as genocide. Other scholars stress that the 1948 UN Genocide Convention is not retroactive and requires proof of specific intent (dolus specialis). In Perinçek v. Switzerland (Grand Chamber, 2015), the European Court of Human Rights decided a freedom of expression case and stated that it was not ruling on whether the events constituted genocide.

Will the Border Open, and What Does Ankara Ask of Yerevan?

The border has not been opened for regular traffic, and a timetable depends mainly on the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace track. In June 2022, both sides said they would allow third-country nationals and diplomatic passport holders to cross, but implementation has lagged, so travellers should check current official notices.

Based on public statements by Turkish officials, Ankara's asks can be summarized as follows:

• progress toward, and signature of, a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan;
• confirmation of the existing border under the Kars framework, with no territorial claims;
• a constructive approach to the historical dialogue, preferably through the commission format;
• an end to efforts to internationalize the 1915 issue through third-country legislatures.

Yerevan's public requests are that the border be opened and diplomatic relations established independently of the other issues, and that history not be made a condition.

Source Comparison

Readers should check primary texts: the 1921 Kars Treaty, the 2009 Zurich Protocols, official foreign ministry readouts and the 2020 trilateral statement. For common claims and corrections, see Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media, Checked Against Primary Sources.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Special Representatives: envoys appointed in December 2021 to negotiate normalization: Ambassador Serdar Kılıç for Türkiye and Deputy Speaker Ruben Rubinyan for Armenia.
• Events of 1915: Türkiye's official term for the wartime relocation of Ottoman Armenians; Armenian and many international sources use 'genocide'. The legal term is defined by the 1948 UN Genocide Convention.
• Joint Historical Commission: Türkiye's 2005 proposal for historians from both countries and third countries to study all archives together.
• Fair Memory (Adil Hafıza): Ankara's approach that historical questions should be handled through scholarship and dialogue instead of political resolutions.
• Treaty of Kars (1921): treaty that fixed the Turkish–Armenian frontier, with Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia as parties alongside Soviet Russia.
• 3+3 platform: a regional forum of Türkiye, Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia.

Related guides: The Events of 1915: Archives, Legal Criteria and Türkiye's Fair Memory Approach, Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media, Türkiye as Mediator, The 1936 Montreux Convention Explained and Editorial Principles: How The Political Anatomy Separates Fact, Law and Position.

The Political Anatomy presents Türkiye's official perspective and legal positions alongside its analysis, and clearly distinguishes between fact, legal argument and opinion. Wherever possible, claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, Ottoman and Turkish state archives, and official statements.