Türkiye as Mediator: Russia–Ukraine Talks, the Black Sea Grain Initiative and Gaza Humanitarian Diplomacy

Why It Matters

Türkiye is one of very few states that has hosted Russia–Ukraine talks at ministerial and delegation level and co-signed a deal with both belligerents. That deal, the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), moved roughly 33 million tonnes of Ukrainian grain and food to world markets between August 2022 and July 2023. The record also shows the limits: mediation produced humanitarian arrangements and prisoner exchanges, but not a ceasefire or a political settlement, and the grain corridor ended when Russia withdrew.

Background

The war and the Turkish Straits

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on 2022-02-24. On 2022-02-28 Ankara announced it would implement Article 19 of the 1936 Montreux Convention, which restricts the passage of belligerent warships through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles (with a narrow exception for ships returning to their home base). For the legal mechanics, see The 1936 Montreux Convention Explained: Turkish Straits, Article 19 and Black Sea Security.

The war also cut off Ukraine's seaports. The FAO Food Price Index reached a record high in March 2022, and the UN warned of risks to import-dependent countries.

Timeline of Türkiye's mediation track

How the Black Sea Grain Initiative worked

The BSGI was a four-party arrangement with a clear architecture:

• Three Ukrainian ports: Odesa, Chornomorsk and Yuzhne/Pivdennyi.
• Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) in Istanbul: staffed by officials from Türkiye, Russia, Ukraine and the UN, which approved vessel registrations and itineraries.
• Inspections: ships were inspected by JCC teams (inbound for cargo, outbound for contents) to address Russian concerns about arms smuggling.
• Turkish coordination: Turkish naval and maritime authorities supported safe-passage and inspection logistics.
• UN track: a parallel UN–Russia memorandum aimed at easing obstacles to Russian agricultural and fertilizer exports, which Moscow considered a core part of the package.

UN figures put total deliveries at about 32.9 million tonnes; Turkish officials cite 33 million-plus. Corn made up the largest share, followed by wheat. The deal is credited with helping lower global food prices from their 2022 peak, although economists continue to debate how much of that effect was due to the corridor.

Collapse and aftermath

Russia said its part of the package was not implemented, citing obstacles to banking access for its agricultural exporter, insurance, logistics and a stalled ammonia pipeline proposal. The UN and Ukraine said the Black Sea exports were operating as agreed and that the UN had worked to facilitate Russian exports. After the lapse, Ukraine opened its own corridor along the western Black Sea coast without Russian guarantees, and exports continued under higher risk and insurance costs. Erdoğan repeatedly proposed reviving the initiative, but Russia tied any return to the implementation of its demands.

Prisoner exchanges and humanitarian files

Türkiye has facilitated prisoner exchanges and humanitarian contacts, including arrangements involving Azovstal commanders who stayed in Türkiye in 2022 and returned to Ukraine in July 2023 (a move that drew Russian objections). The 2025 Istanbul rounds produced one of the largest exchanges of the war.

Gaza and Palestine

After the attacks of 2023-10-07 and the Gaza war, Türkiye called for an immediate ceasefire, unhindered humanitarian access and a two-state outcome based on the 1967 lines with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. Türkiye has recognised the State of Palestine since 1988. It sent humanitarian aid via Egypt, hosted Palestinian factions for talks, restricted trade with Israel in 2024, and announced it would intervene in the ICJ case brought by South Africa. In October 2025 Türkiye took part, with Egypt, Qatar and the US, in the Sharm el-Sheikh summit endorsing the Gaza ceasefire arrangements.

Somalia, the Balkans and the Organization of Turkic States

• Somalia and the Horn of Africa: Türkiye has been engaged in Somalia since the 2011 famine and President Erdoğan's visit to Mogadishu. On 2024-12-11 the Ankara Declaration, mediated by Türkiye, launched talks between Somalia and Ethiopia after the dispute over Ethiopia's memorandum with Somaliland.
• Balkans: Türkiye has run a trilateral consultation mechanism with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia since 2009 and contributes to NATO's KFOR and the EU's EUFOR Althea missions.
• Organization of Turkic States (OTS): Founded as the Turkic Council in 2009 and renamed OTS at the 2021 Istanbul summit. Members are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye and Uzbekistan, with observers including Hungary and Turkmenistan. The TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) has observer status.

Key Players & Positions

• Russia: Moscow has described Istanbul as an acceptable venue and credits the 2022 and 2025 rounds, but ties a return to the grain deal to the implementation of its own export demands. Russian officials, including the Foreign Ministry, have said that the Russia–UN memorandum was not honoured.
• Ukraine: Kyiv insists on territorial integrity, including Crimea, which Türkiye also does not recognise as part of Russia. It values Türkiye's role in the grain corridor and prisoner exchanges and says Russia obstructs a ceasefire.
• United Nations: The Secretary-General's office and the UN Conference on Trade and Development coordinated the BSGI and Russia memorandum. UN statements credited Türkiye with a pivotal role and called on Russia to return to the deal.
• European Union and NATO allies: They support Ukraine's sovereignty and welcome humanitarian mediation, while pressing Türkiye to align with sanctions on Russia, which Ankara has not joined.
• Israel: The Israeli government says its military campaign responds to Hamas, which it, the US and the EU designate as a terrorist organization. It accuses Türkiye of hosting Hamas figures and has strongly criticised Ankara's rhetoric. Türkiye does not list Hamas as a terrorist organization and rejects the accusations.
• Arab mediators (Egypt, Qatar): Key interlocutors on Gaza; Türkiye has worked alongside them rather than in place of them.

What Mediation Achieved, and Its Limits

Achieved: a functioning grain corridor for about a year, a UN-run inspection mechanism in Istanbul, repeated prisoner exchanges, a venue accepted by both sides in 2022 and 2025, the Ankara Declaration on the Horn of Africa and a role as a ceasefire guarantor in Gaza.

Limits: no ceasefire in Ukraine; the BSGI depended on Russian consent and ended without it; the sanctions question affects how some Western governments view Ankara's neutrality; and in Gaza, Türkiye-Israel relations are strained, limiting Ankara's direct mediation access. Türkiye's own officials acknowledge that mediation cannot replace the political will of the parties.

Source Comparison

Readers should compare UN data and each party's official statements directly. For method, see Editorial Principles, and for common narratives about Türkiye see Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI): the 2022-07-22 Istanbul arrangement for safe grain exports from three Ukrainian ports, with a Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul.
• Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): the four-party body that approved and inspected vessels.
• Montreux Convention (1936): the treaty regulating passage through the Turkish Straits; Article 19 covers belligerent warships in wartime.
• Ankara Declaration (2024-12-11): the Türkiye-brokered framework for Somalia–Ethiopia talks.
• OTS: the Organization of Turkic States, a cooperation platform that Türkiye helped found. Türkiye's parallel diplomacy in the South Caucasus is covered in Türkiye–Armenia Normalization Since 2022.

Related: The Political Anatomy home, About The Political Anatomy, FAQ: Sources, Methodology and Perspective.

Perspective Note

The Political Anatomy presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. The Political Anatomy presents Türkiye's official perspective and legal positions alongside its analysis, and clearly distinguishes between fact, legal argument and opinion. Wherever possible, claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents and official statements. Published by The Political Anatomy Editorial Team.