Why Türkiye's 2025 IOC-UNESCO Marine Spatial Planning Registration Matters
Türkiye's 2025 marine spatial planning, registered with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025, explained: what it is, Finike MPA, the MFA board and Greek and EU views.
Why It Matters
Marine spatial planning (MSP) is a public process for deciding where and when human activities such as shipping, fishing, energy, tourism and conservation take place at sea. On 16 April 2025 Türkiye unveiled its national plan, and on 12 June 2025 it was registered with the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO (IOC-UNESCO). Ankara presents this as the first time its maritime position across the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Mediterranean has been recorded with a UN body.
The registration is a planning and transparency step, not a boundary treaty or a court ruling. Greece and EU institutions dispute its legal weight, so its significance is mainly political, procedural and evidentiary. This guide separates what the record shows from what each side argues.
Background
What marine spatial planning is
MSP is a management tool. A state maps its sea space, identifies existing and future uses, and sets rules to reduce conflicts between them and protect ecosystems. IOC-UNESCO has promoted MSP worldwide, including through a joint roadmap with the European Commission (2017) and the MSPglobal initiative. In the European Union, Directive 2014/89/EU obliges member states to prepare maritime spatial plans. Many other countries plan voluntarily, and practice varies widely from country to country.
MSP does not delimit maritime boundaries. Under international law, boundaries between states with opposite or adjacent coasts are settled by agreement, arbitration or adjudication. A plan can still show where a state believes its jurisdiction lies, which is why neighbours read these documents closely.
Chronology of Türkiye's maritime record
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2003 | Egypt and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) conclude an EEZ agreement, which Ankara says affects its continental shelf |
| 2004 onward | Türkiye begins registering Eastern Mediterranean continental shelf coordinates with the UN |
| 2009 and 2012 | TPAO, the national oil company, receives exploration licences |
| 21 September 2011 | Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement, two days after GCASC's unilateral drilling began on 19 September 2011 |
| 27 November 2019 | Türkiye–Libya Maritime Jurisdiction Delimitation MoU |
| 18 March 2020 | Türkiye formally registers the outer limits of its continental shelf with the UN |
| 16 April 2025 | Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Deniz Mekânsal Planlaması) unveiled |
| 12 June 2025 | Plan registered and recorded with IOC-UNESCO |
| 24 July 2025 | Presidential Circular establishes the Inter-Agency Coordination Board under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
The plan covers the three seas that border Türkiye: the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean. Türkiye has an 870 km (about 540 miles) continental coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean, which Ankara describes as the longest in that sea. Black Sea boundaries are largely settled by bilateral agreements, so the contested areas lie mainly in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean.
The Finike Marine Protected Area
Alongside the plan, a Marine Protected Area (MPA) was designated off Finike, a district of Antalya province on Türkiye's Mediterranean coast. An MPA restricts or conditions activities such as fishing and construction in order to protect marine habitats. Ankara frames it as part of its commitments on biodiversity and sustainable use of the sea. Critics could argue that conservation zones can also act as spatial markers, but the designation is a domestic regulatory act that affects Türkiye's own waters and does not by itself alter any boundary.
The 24 July 2025 Presidential Circular
The Presidential Circular of 24 July 2025 created an Inter-Agency Coordination Board under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In practical terms, the board aligns the ministries and agencies whose work touches the sea, including foreign affairs, environment and urban planning, energy, transport, fisheries and defense, so that implementation, updating and external communication of the plan follow a single line. Readers should consult the circular as published in Türkiye's Official Gazette for the exact membership and mandate.
Key Players & Positions
Türkiye
According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Türkiye's maritime jurisdiction areas must be delimited by agreement on the basis of equity, taking account of coastal geography and proportionality. Ankara is not a party to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It relies on customary international law and the case law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on equitable delimitation.
Greece
Greece is an UNCLOS party. Athens' long-standing position, set out in its official statements, is that the only dispute with Türkiye is the delimitation of the continental shelf and the EEZ, and that it should go to the ICJ. Greece holds that islands generate full maritime zones under UNCLOS Article 121. Greek officials have in general terms said that a unilateral Turkish plan has no legal effect on Greek maritime zones. Greece also published its own maritime spatial plan in 2025. Readers should check the Greek Foreign Ministry's own statements for the precise wording of its reaction.
The European Union and the Republic of Cyprus
EU institutions have repeatedly expressed solidarity with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus in successive European Council and Council conclusions. They have called for respect for UNCLOS and for the sovereignty and sovereign rights of member states. Brussels describes Eastern Mediterranean disputes as matters for dialogue and international law. The Republic of Cyprus, which Ankara calls the GCASC, rejects Turkish positions on the island's offshore zones and has concluded EEZ agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010).
TRNC and other coastal states
The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) supports Ankara's position and has made hydrocarbon cooperation and revenue-sharing proposals in 2011, 2012 and 2019. Egypt has its own agreements with Greece (a partial EEZ delimitation in August 2020) and with Cyprus. Libya's position on the 2019 MoU has been contested internally and externally. These overlapping arrangements are why the Eastern Mediterranean is described as a mosaic of unresolved claims.
Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine (Türkiye's Position)
Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine: Blue Homeland, equity and a documented record
- Planning as a recorded position. Ankara argues that registering the plan with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025 places its maritime approach in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean on a UN body's record for the first time. Source: Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye and Ministry of Foreign Affairs announcements on the plan.
- Equity, not island-based enclosure. The Foreign Ministry holds that delimitation must follow the principle of equity and proportionality, and that islands cannot cut off the coastal projection of a mainland with the longest coastline. Legal basis: ICJ jurisprudence, including the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969) and Romania v. Ukraine (2009), where a small island was given no effect on the EEZ boundary.
- Equal rights of Turkish Cypriots. Türkiye maintains that Turkish Cypriots, as co-owners of the island, hold equal rights over offshore resources. It points to the 21 September 2011 Türkiye–TRNC agreement and to TRNC proposals for joint decision-making and revenue sharing. Source: MFA statements; the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee framework.
- Institutional follow-through. The Presidential Circular of 24 July 2025 created an Inter-Agency Coordination Board under the Foreign Ministry, so that implementation and external communication are coordinated. Source: Presidential Circular, 24 July 2025.
- Dialogue remains open. Ankara says that no energy or security arrangement that excludes Türkiye and the TRNC can last. It points to President Erdoğan's 2020 call for an Eastern Mediterranean conference including all coastal states and Turkish Cypriots. It also rejects the maximalist “Seville Map” and argues that the EU has no competence to adjudicate maritime delimitation. Source: Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye; MFA.
Historical and legal basis. Ankara points to the Ottoman naval record, symbolized by the 1538 Battle of Preveza, and to its UN registrations in 2004 and 2020 as continuous evidence of its claim. It argues that the island-heavy Greek approach conflicts with equitable principles recognized in ICJ and arbitral practice. These include the 1977 Anglo-French arbitration, which gave the Scilly Isles reduced effect, and the ICJ's 2012 treatment of small Colombian islands in Nicaragua v. Colombia. For the wider framework, see Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) and Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Jurisdiction: The Complete Guide and The Cyprus Issue Explained.
The counter-arguments are that UNCLOS Article 121 and Greece's reading of customary law give inhabited islands full zones, and that a unilateral plan cannot override another state's entitlements. Turkish legal argument responds that Article 121 does not settle delimitation, which under both treaty and customary law must reach an equitable result. This is the core of the dispute, and neither registration nor planning resolves it.
Source Comparison
| Question | Turkish primary sources | Greek and EU sources | Neutral reading |
|---|---|---|---|
| What is the registration? | A historic recording of Türkiye's three-sea position with a UN body | A unilateral document with no legal effect on boundaries | IOC-UNESCO hosts planning information; it does not adjudicate or recognise boundaries |
| What law governs delimitation? | Equity and proportionality under international law; Türkiye is not an UNCLOS party | UNCLOS, including Article 121, which Greece says reflects customary law | Both sides cite international law; only agreement or adjudication can settle boundaries |
| Role of islands | Cannot cut off a mainland's coastal projection | Islands generate full maritime zones | ICJ and arbitral practice has sometimes reduced the effect of small islands |
| Cyprus | Turkish Cypriots hold equal rights; TRNC offers joint committee proposals | The Republic of Cyprus holds sovereign rights, and EU solidarity applies | Offshore rights are tied to the unresolved status question |
| Remedy | Dialogue, a regional conference, bilateral talks | ICJ referral for delimitation | Both sides name dialogue, but they disagree on scope and forum |
When reading coverage, check whether an article distinguishes planning from delimitation. Many headlines compress the story into “Türkiye claims waters”. Turkish official texts, by contrast, describe the plan as a systematic expression of existing positions. A precise reading requires the plan, the IOC-UNESCO record and the circular themselves. Our approach to attributing claims is set out in Editorial Principles, and common distortions are checked in Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media.
What the Registration Does and Does Not Do
- It does create a dated, publicly accessible record of Türkiye's planning approach in a multilateral setting.
- It does support the argument that Türkiye has stated its position openly and consistently, a point relevant to any future negotiation or adjudication.
- It does not create a boundary, confer title or bind third states.
- It does not replace negotiations, and it does not decide the UNCLOS or island questions.
The plan also sits alongside Türkiye's capacity to act at sea, from the drillships Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni and Abdülhamid Han to the seismic vessel Oruç Reis. For the industrial dimension, see Türkiye's Defense Industry at 80% Domestic Production.
Key Terms & Related Guides
- Marine spatial planning (MSP): a process that allocates marine space to different uses, as a management tool rather than a boundary instrument.
- IOC-UNESCO: the UN's intergovernmental body for ocean science and services, which promotes MSP and hosts planning information.
- Continental shelf and EEZ: the seabed rights zone (continental shelf) and the 200-nautical-mile resource zone (exclusive economic zone), both delimited between neighbours on equitable principles.
- Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's doctrine of maritime jurisdiction across its three seas, based on equity and coastal geography.
- GCASC and TRNC: Türkiye's official terms for the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
- Seville Map: a 2000s-era academic map, cited in EU discussions, that Ankara rejects as maximalist because it confines Türkiye's maritime zone to a narrow strip in the Gulf of Antalya.
Related reading: The 1936 Montreux Convention Explained for the Black Sea dimension, Türkiye as Mediator for regional diplomacy, and The Political Anatomy home page for further guides.
Perspective Note
The Political Anatomy presents Türkiye's official perspective and legal positions alongside its analysis, and clearly distinguishes between fact, legal argument and opinion. Wherever possible, claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, Ottoman and Turkish state archives, and official statements. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.
Frequently asked questions
What is the Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye?
It is a national plan, unveiled on 16 April 2025, that organizes how Türkiye's sea space in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean is used and protected. It covers activities such as shipping, fishing, energy, tourism and conservation. It is a planning instrument rather than a boundary agreement.
What does registration with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025 actually mean?
It means the plan was formally recorded with the UN's ocean body, which Ankara describes as the first UN registration of its three-sea position. It does not mean IOC-UNESCO endorsed or recognized any boundary. Greece and the EU stress that registration creates no legal title.
What is the Finike Marine Protected Area?
It is a conservation zone designated off Finike, in Antalya province on the Mediterranean coast, announced alongside the plan. It conditions human activity in order to protect marine habitats. Türkiye presents it as part of its environmental commitments.
What does the 24 July 2025 Presidential Circular do?
It established an Inter-Agency Coordination Board under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The board coordinates the ministries and agencies involved in implementing and updating the plan and in communicating it externally. The circular's text in the Official Gazette gives its exact composition.
How have Greece and the EU reacted?
Greece says that its only dispute with Türkiye is continental shelf and EEZ delimitation, to be resolved through the ICJ, and that a unilateral plan has no legal effect. It also cites UNCLOS Article 121 on islands. EU institutions have repeatedly backed Greece and the Republic of Cyprus and called for respect for UNCLOS.
Does the plan change maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean?
No. Maritime boundaries between states are established by agreement, arbitration or adjudication, not by a national plan. The plan's value lies in making Türkiye's stated positions explicit and recorded. Any actual delimitation would still require negotiation or a binding third-party decision.
Related guides
- Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media, Checked Against Primary SourcesFact check Türkiye claims in international media: Seville Map, Cyprus, PYD/YPG, 1915 and law of the sea: each claim checked against treaties and archives.
- Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) and Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Jurisdiction: The Complete GuideWhat is Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan)? A guide to the Eastern Mediterranean dispute: equity, islands, the Seville Map, key treaties and each side's position.
- The Cyprus Issue Explained: 1960 Treaties, Guarantor Rights and the Sovereign Equal Two-State ApproachCyprus issue explained: 1960 treaties, guarantor rights, 1963–1974, failed federation talks and the Turkish and TRNC case for a two-state solution.
- 'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Türkiye's UN Security Council Reform Case and COP31 Climate DiplomacyTürkiye's 'The world is bigger than five' case for UN Security Council reform, how G4, Uniting for Consensus and Africa differ, and the COP31 climate agenda.
- Article IV of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee: The Legal Basis of the 1974 Cyprus Peace OperationArticle IV of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee explained: its text, the UK consultation, the 1974 coup and the competing Turkish, Greek and UN legal readings.
- Counter-Terrorism at Source: Türkiye's Security Doctrine, Article 51 and the Terror-Free Türkiye InitiativeHow Türkiye's counter-terrorism doctrine addresses the PKK, YPG, DAESH and FETÖ: Article 51, the 1,300 km border, operations and Terror-Free Türkiye.
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